SERAP Urges Court To Dismiss N5bn Suit From DSS
The Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project has on Thursday urged the Federal Capital Territory High Court, Maitama, Abuja, to dismiss the alleged N5bn defamation suit filed against it by officials of the Department of State Services
Adopting its final written address before Justice Yusuf Halilu, SERAP argued that the claimants failed to establish that the alleged defamatory publication referred to them personally.
The claimants, Sarah John and Gabriel Ogundele, sued SERAP and its Deputy Director, Kolawole Oluwadare, in suit No. FCT/HC/CV/4547/24.
They are seeking N5bn in damages, N50m in legal costs, a public apology to be published on SERAP’s website and in national newspapers and aired on television stations, as well as 10 per cent annual interest on the judgment sum until fully paid.
They alleged that SERAP falsely claimed the DSS invaded its Abuja office in September 2024, an assertion they said damaged their reputations and that of the service.
Advertisement
At the resumed sitting, counsel to the first defendant, Victoria Bassey, while adopting her client’s final written address, informed the court that she seeks to adopt the reply on the point of law and all the paragraphs as the case against the claimant
Adumbrating on what she described as “some salient points”, Bassey urged the court to discountenance the suit.
“My Lord, this is a simple case of defamation. We seek to point, my Lord, to the Supreme Court case of Onu and Agbese, which states that where a plaintiff is not named in a defamation case, he must prove that reasonable persons understood the words to refer to him. The law is now tried that for a plaintiff to succeed in an action for defamation, he must not only prove that the defendant published the defamatory words, but he must also identify himself as the person defamed.
“The court further held that a reasonable person reading the publication would associate the defamatory words with the plaintiff?
“For the purpose of emphasis, the publications in this issue refer to DSS. They did not mention the claimant’s name or mention their ranks or their units. There was no referral to any personal identifiers. Your Lordship will agree that DSS is a national security agency with thousands of officers. Words directed at such a broad institutional body cannot automatically become personal defamation,” She argued.
Advertisement
Speaking further, she said, “We urge my Lord, to discountenance their suits”.
Counsel to the second defendant, Oluwatosin Adesioye, while adopting his final written address, described the lawsuit as an “offensive suit”.
He added, saying, “We adopt this address, my Lord, as the case of the second defendant in seeking an outright dismissal of this suit.
He told the Court that two publications were made in September 2024 in respect of an operation allegedly carried out at the office of the first defendant.
“My Lord, while the position is clear that a party doesn’t need to be named for it to be referred to, it is striking that the claimant whose name is not identified in a publication has the further step to give special circumstances to why he should be tied to that publication. In this case, my Lord, he failed to establish that special circumstance.
“Indeed, they were referenced; it did not plead particulars of any knowledge of special fact or intrinsic fact, my Lord. The pleadings are clear. They have relied on the publication that they were described as, with their pictures, a tall, dark, large lady, a slim, dark man. You want that special knowledge to help this court tie why all the thousand members of DSS would not be able to be tied to that publication when they read it.
Advertisement
“My Lord, during the trial, when the second witness came to testify that he knew that the publication was referred to them. On that examination, he confirmed that it was after he had read the publication and was informed institutionally by the said department in charge of the claimants that he was able to tie the said publication to them,” the lawyer said.
He noted that the principle of defamation is at the moment of the reader reading the said publication, not after getting new facts to tie or have a linkage with the people being identified.
“So, my Lord, they ought to have pleaded that first and foremost, that they are such a popular jingle that every member of DSS knows them since the day they got employed and immediately that publication was released, they were able to point out that this refers to the two claimants in this case. They did not plead such, my Lord,” he said.
He proceeded to urge the court to dismiss the suit with substantial force.
Counsel to the claimants, Akinlolu Kehinde (SAN), while adopting their final written address dated January 30, 2026, urged the court to grant all the reliefs sought.
“My Lord, I humbly adopt these addresses and uphold this honourable court to grant all of the claimant’s reliefs,” he said.
He argued that the second defendant’s written address exceeded the page limit allowed by law and should be discounted.
He said to the Court that the second defendant’s written address is 12 pages instead of the allowed 10 pages. As stated in Order 39, Rule 2 of the court.
“Historically, the judicial stance has always been that when a process exceeds the page limits stipulated under the rules, as long as it is accepted for filing by the registry, it is a mere irregularity that does not touch on the competence of the process.
“In addition, my lord, the rules are clear that where an address exceeds the required number of pages, the court shall discontinue the address. As such, my lord, we humbly urge this honourable Court to discontinue the second defendant’s reply to the claimant’s final written address,” he said.
On the substantive issue, he claimed the publication referred to the claimants.
“On the substantive issue, the narrow issue in contention, my lord, is the second ingredient of defamation, which is that the defamatory material must refer to the claimants.
“The defendants have relied on a legal misconception that everybody in society must know that publication refers to the claimant, but that is not the law. There is a principle of innuendo whereby if people with contextual facts, background facts, know that the publication refers to the claimants, the second ingredient of publication has been met.”
In response, the second defendant’s counsel argued that the rule did not prescribe any specific penalty for non-compliance with the number of pages allowed.
“My lord, we are saying first and foremost, my lord, where there is no specific penalty stating that it shall discountenance. The provision there is at par, my lord. We are saying that this court has the discretion to look at that person having been found an interest of due substantial justice over that technicality”.
He faulted the claimant’s address, stating that his final address is 35 pages instead of the allowed 30 pages by law.
“Above all, my lord, we are also saying that this reply address was filed in response to a 35-page final address filed by the claimant, which is also an illegal violation of the 30-page maximum requirement for filing an address.
Justice Halilu, however, noted that final written addresses cannot replace evidence before the court.
“So, addresses are meant to be another opportunity for you to come up with a comprehensive and in-depth understanding of the law. You garnish it with the evidence before the court, giving the court the opportunity to be able to see the strengths and weaknesses of your respective cases.
“Looking at all you have put before me, the most important thing is the evidence before the court, and that is very, very important. So, in trying to do justice, we try as much as possible to balance whatever arguments you have before us. In that wise, we will adjourn for judgment,” Justice Halilu said.
He subsequently proceeded to reserve judgment in the matter.
